Abstract-Threshold cryptography is a novel cryptographic techniq u e sharing secret am ong m em b ers. I t divides a secret k ey into m u ltiple shares b y a cryptographic operation. This techniq u e is u sefu l to provide a shared secret k ey to legitim ate nodes in a infrastru ctu re-less m ob ile ad-hoc netw ork (M A N E T). A s an additional com ponent, P roactive S ecret S haring (P S S ) allow s a set of nodes holding shares to refresh all shares b y generating a new set of shares for the sam e secret k ey from the old shares w ithou t reconstru cting the secret k ey. I t is necessary to reasonab ly escape from threats of ex posing the secret k ey w hen threshold cryptography is u sed.
I n this paper, w e design the P S S protocol im plem entation specifi cation in a M A N E T environm ent. I n ou r schem e all share holder nodes synchroniz e the P S S procedu re in a w ell-m anaged fashion to k eep the protocol consistency. W e then introdu ce ou r actu al im plem entation and evalu ate the b ehavior and its perform ance criteria.
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
A m obile ad -hoc netw ork (MA N E T ) architecture enables m obile nod es to ins tantaneous group com m unication im m ed iately and eas ily . In this netw ork , each m obile nod e creates com m unication p ath w ith neighbor m obile nod es in the s am e rad io range and s end s d ata to a d es tination nod e d irectly or through thes e neighbor nod es . In this m anner a d ata forw ard ing p ath is es tablis hed w ith arbitrary nod es in a MA N E T for forw ard ing or receiving d ata. A ccord ing to its p rop erty , it is d es irable for legitim ate nod es to es tablis h s ecure channels for their com m unication in ord er to avoid threats that m alicious nod es eaves d rop or tam p er the d ata. H ow ever, lack of fi x ed infras tructure or centraliz ed ad m inis tration m ay lead its d iffi culties ; w hat is m ore critical and com p lex is that a s ecret group k ey that is us ed to encry p t d ata cannot be eas ily and s ecurely d is tributed to thes e legitim ate nod es .
A nod e d is tinction could be m ad e at the ap p lication lay er w here acces s to a s ervice or p articip ation to its collaborative s up p ort is allow ed only to the group m em bers . In ord er to es tablis h s ecure com m unication w ith them , us e of a s hared group k ey for m es s age encry p tion and d ecry p tion fulfi lls the req uirem ent. Y et another concern relates to the group k ey s haring m echanis m ; once a m obile nod e is authenticated as a legitim ate group m em ber, at nex t the corres p ond ing s ecret group k ey m us t be given s ecurely to the new m em ber.
It is p laus ible to as s um e that the k ey can be d is tributed by es tablis hing a trans ient s ecure channel. U nfortunately , it is a d iffi cult tas k and not neces s arily s uitable for group com m unication in a MA N E T environm ent that is com p ris ed of m any m obile nod es , es p ecially w hen w e cons id er the p os s ibility that an end nod e of a s ecure channel m ay be out of range d uring or after s ucces s ful s etup of a s ecure channel.
A s the p otential s olution, threshold cryptography [2 ] p rovid es a benefi cial ap p roach. In the (n, t) thres hold cry p tograp hy , a s ecret group k ey -a s hared k ey -is d ivid ed into n s hares and k ep t by n legitim ate nod es , w hich w e call s hare hold ers . L ater, a new nod e collects t s hares from the res p ons e of t nod es (am ong n nod es ) and generates the original s ecret k ey as a legitim ate nod e. Since this s chem e d oes not req uire trans m itting a s ecret k ey its elf to m obile nod es , it increas es the s ecure level. F urtherm ore it w ork s even w ith a bus y MA N E T w here netw ork top ology and m obile nod es are d y nam ically changed , if w e can as s um e that t or m ore s hare hold ers res id e in the netw ork .
In this s chem e, the fund am ental req uirem ent is that each s hare m us t not be d is clos ed w ithin the s hare trans m is s ion p roced ure; if t or m ore s hares are s tolen by m alicious nod es w ithin a long s p an of tim e, the s ecret k ey is fi nally generated by them . H ere P roactiv e S ecret S harin g (P S S ) [3 ] [4 ] reas onably p rovid es the w ay to es cap e from threats of ex p os ing the s ecret k ey . PSS allow s to refres h all s hares by generating a new s et of s hares for the s am e s ecret k ey from the old s hares w ithout recons tructing the s ecret k ey , and then the old s hare is us eles s after the refres h of each s hare.
PSS is therefore a neces s ary com p onent of a k ey m anagem ent p rotocol us ing thres hold cry p tograp hy . T o k eep a p rotocol cons is tency , all s hare hold ers m us t coop erate w ith the PSS p roced ure in a w ell-m anaged fas hion. In fact, w hile there are s everal references that have ap p lied the k ey s haring techniq ue us ing thres hold cry p tograp hy [5 ] [6 ] [7 ] , im p ortant p rop erties res id ed in the PSS p roced ure have not been d etailed therein.
In this p ap er, w e p rop os e a PSS s y nchroniz ation p roced ure and its actual im p lem entation. T o evaluate its behavior, w e m eas ure the p erform ance on top of our w ireles s tes tbed . O ur m ain contribution in this p ap er is to d efi ne the s tructure of PSS im p lem entation that relates to thres hold cry p tograp hy ; y et cons id ering the im p lem entation s p ecifi cation of thres hold cry p tograp hy , includ ing m ethod s how the s ecret group k ey its elf is boots trap p ed (i.e. initially generated ) and how n and t for (n, t) thres hold cry p tograp hy are d efi ned , is out of s cop e of this p ap er.
T he rem aind er of this p ap er is organiz ed as follow s : In Section II w e inves tigate and analy z e threshold cryptography and P roactiv e S ecret S harin g (P S S ) techniq ues . In Section III we detail the structure of the PSS synchronization procedure and its actual implementation. The protocol evaluation and performance measurement are discussed in Section IV , and then Section V concludes this paper with outlining future work.
II. OV ERV IEW

A. Threshold Cryptography
Threshold cryptography is a novel cryptographic technique sharing secret among nodes. The idea comes from Shamir's discussion about the company's secret key [1 ] . An (n, t) threshold cryptography scheme (where n ≥ t) allows n nodes to share the ability to perform a cryptographic operation, so that any t nodes can perform this operation jointly, whereas it is infeasible for at most t−1 nodes to do so, even by collusion.
Formally, a t − 1-degree polynomial is constructed such that the constant coefficient (i.e., S) is the secret and all other coefficients are random elements:
In this case, each of the n shares is a pair of (x i , y i ) of numbers such that f (x i ) = y i where i ∈ { 1 . . . n}, x i = 0. Now given any t shares, the polynomial is uniquely determined and hence the secret S can be computed by using Lagrange interpolation. In summary, threshold cryptography is a useful technique for sharing and distributing a secret group key with multiple mobile nodes in a MANET, because (1 ) it does not require any key infrastructure, (2) it avoids the single point of failure for the key distribution, and (3) it works even with a busy network when we assume at least t nodes having corresponding shares reside in the same network.
As a concrete key management system in a MANET environment, one secret group key and its t − 1-degree polynomial can be defined with an (n, t) threshold cryptography scheme. Distribution of trust in the system is accomplished with allowing n share holders to share the ability to perform a cryptographic operation. W hen a new mobile node wants to join a secure group communication, the new node asks t or more share holders nodes to the group to give their shares. Each share is then distributed to the new node through a secure link established by their own public/private key pairs [8 ] whose services could be guaranteed by distributing the Certified Authority (CA) functionality to each share holder as defined in [9 ] or other mechanism. The new node then constructs the secret group key without knowing the pre-used polynomial or any other information.
Such key management service actually works under several assumptions, which require additional components to be more appropriate for MANETs. For instance, a secret key and its polynomial must be securely initialized by some manner, and each share must be initially distributed to n share holders securely. After these preparation, a new node must be authenticated by some mechanism before each share holder distributes own share to the node. W e leave such details and imprinting behavior to a separate paper currently in preparation. 
B . Proactive Secret Sharing
Threshold cryptography provides the way to convey a shared key to a node without the aid of key infrastructure and is suitable for a secret key sharing in a MANET. However, given t or more shares in an (n, t) threshold cryptography scheme, the secret S can be found. W ithout the share refresh and with infinite time span it is not hard for malicious nodes to compromise at least t share holder nodes and finally obtain the secret key.
To make each share refresh without disclosure of any share or a secret key itself, Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) [3] [4] can be employed with threshold cryptography as an additional component. It allows to refresh all shares by generating a new set of shares for the same secret key from the old shares without reconstructing the secret key.
In the PSS implementation, each share holder randomly generates own sub-shares (e.g., (s i1 , s i2 , . . . , s in ) on node i), and each sub-share is mutually exchanged to refresh own share. More precisely, the PSS procedure shown in Fig.1 can be performed in the following steps: 1 ) Let (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) be an (n, t) sharing of the secret key S of the service, with node i having s i . 2) Node i (i ∈ { 1 . . . n}) randomly generates s i 's subshares (s i1 , s i2 , . . . , s in ) for an (n, t) sharing of 0. 3) Every sub-share s ij (j ∈ { 1 . . . n}) is distributed to node j through secure link. 4) W hen node j gets the sub-shares (s 1j , s 2j , . . . , s nj ), it computes a new share from these sub-shares and its old share with an equation:
5) Now each share (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) is an (n, t) sharing of the secret key S, because n j= 1 s ij = 0, ∀i ∈ { 1 . . . n}. After each PSS, all the shares will be changed, so that old shares become useless. In such case, since it is impossible to obtain new share from old share, a malicious node must collect at least t shares during the time between two executions of the PSS, which obviously makes his job more difficult. 
III. PSS IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE
A. Objective
While existing PSS proposals prove its literature and mechanism, lack of its concrete implementation does not promote its functionality to the real communication environment. This may cause the situation that PSS is not widely used in a MANET in spite of its advantages.
PSS is a periodic or on-demand protocol; any active share holder in the network can trigger the PSS protocol at any time. Here, objective exists in this condition. If an arbitrary share holder starts a PSS procedure without any timing coordination with other share holders, or if each share holder tries to refresh its own share using some concurrent scheme, where all share holders just perform communication and computation in parallel, protocol inconsistency may happen, and a new node may receive inconsistent shares and then cannot generate the secret key.
Let us see Fig.2 [A] showing periodic PSS procedures. In an (n, t) sharing of S, if a new node requests shares and can get t shares between the last and the next PSS procedures (such as A in this figure) , the node will generate S without any trouble. However, if a new node requests to get shares during PSS (e.g. B), share holders should make the node wait for their PSS and give their new shares afterward or suspend their PSS and give their current shares. Or, if a new node tries to get shares just before PSS is started (e.g. C), each share holder should put the PSS on hold until the node successfully get current t shares. These matters imply that a share holder needs to know w hen a new share can be used as own share and w hen the new share can be given to a new node.
As well as such timing issue, there is another concern related to untraceable sub-share transmission. The considerable story is, while a share holder can understand whether it has gotten sub-shares generated by other share holders successfully, it does not know other share holders also have gotten necessary sub-shares successfully. Or, if a share holder does not get sub-shares from corresponding share holders due to loss of connectivity with them, it should not keep waiting for the reply from the share holders for a long span of time. This situation will be especially happened in a MANET environment in which mobile nodes may leave from the network or turn off itself without any notification.
Let us see Fig.2 [B]. Three share holders (s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 ) start their PSS procedure and exchange each sub-share. For instance, because of the link failure, s 3 cannot give its sub-share to s 2 . The worst phenomenon here is s 1 does not know that s 2 and s 3 had the share transmission problem and hence may start giving its new share to a new node, which is an inconsistent share to other old shares. In this case, share holders should keep own old shares until all share holders complete their PSS (for a short period) or change the (n, t) sharing to an (n − 1, t − 1) sharing (with eliminating the left share holder) along their pre-determined policy.
One may deduce that simply all share holders may be able to broadcast own sub-shares to other share holders and count the number of received sub-shares to know that all share holders successfully synchronize the PSS process, instead of implementing PSS iteratively. However, sub-share transmission must be secure; if a mobile node in the same MANET receives sub-shares via broadcast, it can generate a new share from the corresponding old share and maintain the new share that should not be owned by the node. This will contradict our approach, and therefore it is necessary to securely transmit sub-shares only to the corresponding share holder.
B. Specifi cation
According to the consideration aforementioned, we need to have some mechanism that informs the status that all share holders have finished each share refresh and the new ones are now ready to use. To that purpose, special notation called tok en is introduced for triggering the PSS procedure in our protocol. Using tok en is straightforward manner to control the timing of the procedure; only one share holder in the network can have tok en and the PSS protocol is started by the tok en holder. Since it is assumed all share holders are the members of the group and hence have the corresponding secret group key S, tok en can be given by H(S), where H is 160 bits of the SHA-1 [10 ] hash.
Upon triggering a PSS procedure, tok en holder exchanges own sub-shares with other (n − 1) share holders. After tok en holder computes its new share from its old share and received sub-shares, it sends a PSS_REQUEST message to all share holders in order to notify the PSS procedure is started and passes the tok en to the next share holder. (For these procedures, we assume each share holder has maintained a list of IP addresses of all share holders with the same order.) Likewise tok en passes through the (n − 1)-th share holder and finally reaches to the n-th share holder (i.e. the last share holder). After this n-th share holder updates its share, it sends the tok en to the original tok en holder. Since the original tok en holder can recognize all share holders have finished refreshing shares at that time, it sends a PSS_DONE message to all share holders to indicate the completion of PSS. These share holders can then discard old shares and start using new shares. The share holder that sends the PSS_DONE message keeps the mission to work as token holder again and will later start the next PSS procedure.
When token holder does not exist in a network due to an initial phase or its departure from the network, or when a share holder that does not hold the token needs to refresh the share (due to some security reason etc.), one of arbitrary share holders will spontaneously send a PSS_REQUEST message to all share holders to become new token holder and then trigger a new PSS procedure. If some share holder disappears from the network during or before a PSS procedure, that node must be skipped from the procedure after pre-determined time out. In this situation, active share holders may keep using own old shares or may change the (n, t) sharing to an (n − 1, t − 1) sharing by eliminating non-existing share holder and regenerate their new shares, whereas it depends on a predetermined policy in the group and this paper does not discuss such details.
For the timing matter shown in Fig.2 , if some share holders receive a share obtainment request from a new mobile node during their PSS procedure -in the time period that the share holders have received a PSS_REQUEST message but have not received a PSS_DONE message yet -or just before their PSS procedure, the share holders offer to suspend the PSS procedure by sending a PSS_SUSPEND message to all share holders. When token holder receives this message, it stops forwarding token and the all share holders wait for the new node to receive shares. After the reasonable time period, the token holder sends a PSS_REQUEST message to share holders to notify they resume the previous PSS procedure.
In fact, our current protocol does not assume that a share holder traces when a new node completes its share obtainment, yet some intelligent mechanism to do it may be needed in the future.
C. M essage Transm ission
As well as share transmission to a new node, sub-share and token transmission must be in secure. For this matter, since we assumed that all share holders have certified other share holders' public keys [8] prior to share or sub-share transmission and token distribution, these data can be encrypted with the corresponding public key of the share holder and transferred to each share holder.
Regarding a PSS_DONE message, a PSS_REQUEST message and a PSS_SUSPEND message, they should be also securely distributed to all share holders. Unlike share or subshare transmission, they can be encrypted by the secret group key S because these messages are distributed to multiple share holders, and therefore using multicast would be the valuable solution. Yet there is one concern of this model; several group members whose group keys are different possibly coexist in a same MANET and may run independent PSS procedures with different nodes in the network. In this case, differentiating the destination multicast address of these messages for each PSS procedure would filter out unneeded messages on share holder side. Our protocol therefore arranges the multicast address for each message as with the following rule: {m u lticast address prefix } | {leftm ost H(S)} where a m u lticast address prefix comes from a tentative 16 bits (for IPv4) or 64 bits (for IPv6) address prefix prepared for our PSS protocol and leftm ost H(S) indicates part of token, which is the leftmost 16 bits (for IPv4) or 64 bits (for IPv6) of SHA-1 hash value of the group key (S). Here, " |" is an operation to concatenate left and right strings. Thanks to this manner, we can relatively reduce the possibility of multicast address duplication of PSS procedures; share holders listening on the same multicast group address are usually the same group member and expect that given PSS_DONE, PSS_REQUEST and PSS_SUSPEND messages are sent from the corresponding share holders. Note that, even if the multicast address of these messages is duplicated with different PSS procedures, each share holder can finally choose appropriate messages by checking the token inside the messages.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our PSS protocol is implemented in Java, using Java 2 SDK 1.4.2 08. We have adopted Triple DES (24 bytes) as the cryptographic function with embedded Java class, javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.
We have made performance measurement tests to evaluate our PSS implementation. All tests have been done on our testbed in which multiple Linux laptops are connected through a dedicated wireless network in which all mobile nodes communicate directly (i.e. without a MANET routing protocol). In this experiment we have obtained the average time for completing the PSS procedure on all share holders in a MANET. The test results indicate the performance of generating each sub-share and share, but do not include data communication costs, which may be increased by packet loss or other issues in a real wireless MANET environment.
Our protocol uses token in terms of synchronizing the PSS procedure with all share holders. This protocol controls the timing of share refresh by keeping all share holders informed about each other and avoids inconsistency of share distribution to a new mobile node. While each sub-share is transferred by token holder in this manner, it can be calculated by each share holder prior to the sub-share distribution. Fig.3 shows the situation that three share holders (s 1 , s 2 and s 3 ) make a PSS procedure with using token.
[A] shows the straightforward manner: token holder starts a PSS procedure and each share computes own share upon reception of token. Instead, in [B] sub-shares are preliminarily prepared on each share holder before PSS is triggered, and PSS is compiled only with sub-share transmission. Comparing with Fig.3 [A] and [B], the time difference given by (a + b) may indicate some effectiveness due to parallel sub-share calculation. We therefore prepared additional implementation that provides parallel sub-share calculation and measured the performance of the implementation in order to know how it reduces the total time to complete PSS. Now we show the required items every share holder must hold prior to the PSS procedure:
• Corresponding share (s i ), which is not owned by other share holders • IP address list of all share holders, which are sorted in ascending order • Other share holders' public keys to encrypt sub-share transmission Additionally, one of share holders behaves as token holder, and it has token, which is given by hash value of S, while it is not a problem even if token holder does not exist in the network (see Section III-B).
Our measurement results are shown in Fig.4 . According to this performance graph, the time difference between "iterative sub-share calculation" and "parallel sub-share calculation" is small. The former result shows the time of sub-share calculation that are given by step-by-step manner such as Fig.3  [A] , and the latter one shows the time that each share holder preliminarily generates own sub-shares instead of waiting for the sub-share transmission in a parallel fashion such as Fig.3 [B]. From this observation, the cost of sub-share calculation is much smaller than the delay of sub-share transmission over TCP in a wireless network.
The time that it takes for the nodes to synchronize with our protocol scheme, increases linearly in the number of share holders. This fact actually does not imply an optimistic situation; a desirable property of a synchronization algorithm would be that all share holders become aware of all others in a constant amount of time, as opposed to in O(n) as here.
As another discussion, although PSS makes the share distribution securely, more than enough iteration of PSS procedures will simply overload share holders and consume their precious power. Therefore refining a well-managed timing to trigger a PSS procedure is important criteria, whereas this consideration would be in our future work.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a PSS synchronization structure used with a secret key sharing mechanism on top of threshold cryptography in a MAMET environment. We have explained our actual PSS implementation, which uses token to synchronize the PSS procedure among all share holders.
To know whether performance advantage can be given by sub-share generation in a parallel fashion, we have also examined the implementation which makes preliminary subshare generation instead of waiting for the sub-share transmission. In terms of performance measurement of our PSS implementations, we prepared a dedicated wireless network and ran the PSS protocol over the network.
According to the test results, while the PSS procedure can be well organized with feasible sense, it may have some performance impact when the number of share holders is accordingly increased. To the best of our knowledge, our PSS protocol is a novel proposition with no other protocols to compare to, and hence our next step would be observing the performance impact over a real MANET routing protocol like AODV [11] .
It is necessary to complete a secret key sharing mechanism with additional procedures and components for PSS. Integrating various related protocols like threshold cryptography with our PSS protocol would provide a feasible communication model. Considering the appropriate specification of threshold cryptography, including methods how the secret group key itself is bootstrapped and how n and t for (n, t) threshold cryptography are defined, is our future work.
